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Title 
 
Adversarialism in Italy: using the concept of legal culture to 
understand resistance to legal modifications 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on the author’s empirical study on Italian prosecutors, this article uses legal 
culture to analyze the reasons why prosecutors are resisting certain legal 
modifications. In so doing, this paper tries to offer a fresh perspective over 
(comparative) global issues, such as: the meaning of inquisitorial and adversarial in 
modern criminal justice systems, the impact of legal transplants and legal translations 
and the centrality of prosecutors’ powers in contemporary criminal justice systems. In 
particular, the analysis of legal culture in a comparative perspective can stretch our 
imagination about what is the true extent of prosecutors’ powers, and how these can 
be related and balanced against the defendant’s rights.      
 
1. Introduction 
 
The reform of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (cpp) in 1989 was an ambitious 
attempt to transplant adversarial normative principles within a legal system that had 
always been inquisitorial. This attempt quickly failed. Subsequent Acts of Parliament 
and decisions of the Constitutional Court substantially limited the adversarialism that 
had been introduced in 1989. The result is a criminal justice system that mixes some 
features of adversarialism with the inquisitorial tradition.
1
 There is quite a rich 
academic literature discussing and analyzing this interesting blend of inquisitorial and 
adversarial normative principles.
2
 Authors have mainly tried to emphasize the extent 
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to which adversarialism has influenced the Italian criminal justice system.
3
 The 
conclusion is straightforward: there has certainly been a strong degree of inquisitorial 
resistance that may have affected the impact of certain legal modifications. But there 
is a lack of empirical research in this area. In other words, previous literature has 
focused on the legal analysis of the reform in 1989 and on the impact of subsequent 
legislation and decisions of the Italian Constitutional court. While I discuss and draw 
on this literature, this study intends to focus on something different: the effect of legal 
culture on the internalization of adversarial principles. Lawrence Friedman described 
legal culture as the “ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal 
institutions, which some public or some parts of the public holds”.4 The author also 
explains that ‘internal’ legal culture is the legal culture of “those members of society 
who perform specialized legal tasks”.5 David Nelken redefined the concept and 
argued that: “legal culture is about who we are, not just what we do”.6 Legal culture, 
like culture itself, is certainly a controversial term. As Nelken has put it, the 
coherence and uniformity of given national cultures “will often be no more than a 
rhetorical claim projected by outside observers, or manipulated by elements within the 
culture concerned”.7 This paper does not intend to challenge the limits of an analysis 
that heavily relies on legal culture. And, therefore, generalizations that are based on 
the explanatory force of legal culture will be corroborated and treated with caution. 
I seek to use legal culture to explain why changes are not happening in the 
Italian legal system;
8
 and to interpret Italian prosecutors’ functions and role. This 
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 4 
paper thus uses comparative criminal justice as a Trojan horse to discuss and analyse 
global legal issues such as the effect of legal transplants and the importance of legal 
culture as a heuristic device to understand how legal systems are developing. Why 
comparative law? The obvious answer is that legal transplants can only be studied in a 
comparative context. But I seek to do more than that and to use one case study to 
stretch the borders of criminal justice. In Nelken’s words, I intend to use comparative 
law to stretch “our imagination about what is possible [with regards to criminal 
justice]”.9 In particular, this paper focuses on what is possible when ideas (like the 
adversarial model of criminal process) spread between legal systems and how we can 
grasp the essence of these changes or lack of changes.
10
   
Obviously legal actors can have different perspectives on what they do and 
who they are. In this article I have decided to focus on prosecutors’ ‘internal’ legal 
culture. Prosecutors, together with the police, have a pivotal role during the pre-trial 
phase. They act as gatekeepers of the penal citadel. This means that they take crucial 
decisions on what and how to prosecute by filtering out cases. Prosecutors have 
therefore been allocated a great power that can potentially interfere with the 
defendant’s rights. The difficulties of the criminal justice system to check and balance 
and, to a certain extent, position prosecutors’ powers are common across 
jurisdictions.
11
 Yet, the nature of prosecutors’ powers differs depending on the 
procedural context. For example, in England and Wales, prosecutors charge the 
suspect(s), can ask the police to carry out further investigative acts and decide 
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whether to take over or discontinue a prosecution. But they do not have their hands on 
the investigation, leaving crucial ‘gate-keeping’ decisions to police officers who 
manage the investigation and can refuse to carry out further investigative activities 
that are thought necessary by the prosecutor. In Italy, the importance of prosecutors’ 
decisions is emphasized by their power to conduct the investigation and to direct the 
police during the investigation. 
There is however another reason why Italian prosecutors provide an 
interesting case study. The reform of the code of criminal procedure in 1989 was 
structural and, arguably, the most revolutionary modification was the abolition of the 
inquisitorial-style examining judge. In inquisitorial systems the accuser has a quasi-
judicial status. In particular, Jackson says that “prosecutors within the inquisitorial 
tradition have been more easily able to assume judicial status because they were born 
out of the separation of powers relating to prosecution and investigation which were 
all originally exercised by the judge alone”.12 Italy was not an exception and both 
prosecutors and judges had to act as impartial accusers. Today prosecution is 
monopolized by prosecutors but there are conflicting legal principles that make it 
quite difficult to understand their status in the criminal justice system. Grande 
adamantly argues that the criminal process is a dispute between parties, and 
prosecutors are a party to the proceedings under no duty to search for exculpatory 
evidence.
13
 By contrast, prosecutors belong to the judiciary and, therefore, it is 
arguable that they have retained their quasi-judicial status that binds them to act as 
impartial investigators. There is thus a tension between prosecutors’ institutional 
status and their functional role. But what do prosecutors do in practice? How, and to 
what extent, has the adversarial nature of the Italian criminal justice system 
influenced prosecutors’ legal culture? In answering these questions I try to cast light 
upon the meaning of adversarialism in Italy. In so doing, I partially compare the 
Italian and the English criminal justice systems, with a particular focus on the role and 
status of prosecutors. In this way I intend to highlight the distinctive features of Italian 
criminal procedure and to explain why it is problematic to isolate and analyze its 
adversarial characteristics. Then I analyze prosecutors’ status and functions in the 
context of the current criminal justice system and their legal culture as a form of 
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resistance towards adversarialism. The argument is that prosecutors’ perception of 
their status and of the aims of the criminal justice system is in conflict with some of 
the normative principles currently included in the Italian cpp. This tension must be 
examined to provide a more nuanced and contingent portrayal of prosecutors’ stance 
in the Italian criminal justice system. Finally, I will focus on prosecutors’ views on 
the principle of compulsory prosecution (or legality principle). This principle is stated 
in the Italian constitution and it is crucial to understand how and to what extent 
prosecutors’ legal culture is insulated from adversarial principles.  
This paper draws on the author’s empirical study conducted in Italy between 
April and October 2006. Following some guidance from five consultants (2 
prosecutors, 1 police officer and 2 lawyers), 49 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with prosecutors (27), police officers (11) and lawyers (11).  Whilst some 
interviews were conducted in the centre and the south of Italy, the study is mainly 
focused on practice in the north and 10 prosecution offices were visited (along with 
lawyers and police officers working in the same area).
14
  
   
2. Adversarialism in Italy 
 
The adversary model is based on a system “in which procedural action is controlled 
by the parties and the adjudicator remains essentially passive”;15 on the contrary in the 
inquest model the parties play a minimal role that is “subordinate to the court’s 
function of finding the truth”.16 Today, it is no longer possible to grasp all the 
complexities of the different criminal justice systems by using the dichotomy 
accusatorial and inquisitorial. Consequently, a strict and clear categorization of 
contemporary criminal justice systems is not possible. Adversarial and inquisitorial 
are images which reflect a set of ideas and characteristics, but no criminal procedure 
system is, in practice, fully inquisitorial or adversarial.
17
 Likewise it is important to 
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avoid caricaturing the role of legal actors in common law/adversarial and civil 
law/inquisitorial jurisdictions. This said, adversarial and inquisitorial traditions still 
embody images (or ideals) of criminal process that define partially different ways of 
dealing with crime control. These images reflect different patterns of values and 
principles, which are the foundations of the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions. 
There is thus a connection between values and principles and images of the criminal 
process. This connection is of great importance, because shifting to a different image 
means building on different foundations. And, although these images are not entirely 
satisfactory, they allow to recognise the value and principled choices (i.e. the 
foundations) that underlie the details of a criminal justice system. But why should we 
look at these images? Different ideals can be useful in analysing shifts in direction to 
a specific model of criminal process. We look at the images to analyse the choices 
(i.e. the shifts) that the legislator has made and, more important, to understand the 
consequences of these choices (for example, what are the consequences for legal 
actors and their legal culture?). But how can we carry out this analysis and what can 
we learn? Markovits has written that “dichotomies provide only two-dimensional 
slices through reality: they gave us black and white and – depending upon their degree 
of refinement – innumerable shades of grey […] But they do not give us the reds and 
greens and blues”.18 It is difficult to disagree with this statement; but the usefulness of 
black and white images must be carefully considered. I believe that the traditional 
inquisitorial and adversarial images of process are useful to understand contemporary 
criminal justice systems if used as an axis of reference in relation to legal culture. But 
the aim should not be that of a new taxonomy which uses legal culture to categorize 
contemporary criminal justice systems; rather to analyse the resistance towards legal 
concepts and traditions that do not fit with the borders created by legal actors’ 
professional culture and the practical consequences that this resistance creates in a 
legal system.       
 In 1989 the Italian legislator tried to reform the criminal justice system by 
transplanting adversarial principles that traditionally inform Anglo-American justice. 
America was the polar star. The choice to transplant the American-style criminal 
process was a matter of prestige. Grande argues that the success of the American legal 
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model in Italy can be ascribed to two reasons. First, the strength of the United States’ 
legal scholarship that has diffused its legal ideas around the world.
19
 Secondly, the 
capacity of the American adversarial system to protect individuals against abuses of 
power.
20
 This is particularly important. The Italian legislator in 1989 believed that the 
inquisitorial system was not complying with the image of a fair trial and, more 
precisely, with the principle of equality of arms. The pre-1989 criminal justice system 
relied on the preliminary inquiry to discover evidence, that was then included in a pre-
trial dossier. The view was that the trial court’s review of the dossier inevitably 
“encouraged – consciously or unconsciously – the trial judge to accept the approach 
taken by the public official during the pre-trial phase”.21 
More generally, the 1989 cpp was designed to comply with due process 
principles rather than crime control. Following Packer’s famous distinction,22 one can 
contrast administrative and adjudicative fact-finding. They represent different value 
systems. Administrative fact-finding serves the aims of crime control values. So, 
repression of criminal conduct is the most important function performed by the 
criminal process. As a consequence, proceedings must be efficient and facts must be 
established as quickly as possible with routine procedures which do not rely on a 
formal process of examination. On the contrary, adjudicative fact-finding is related to 
due process values. This module rejects informal administrative fact-finding 
procedures aimed at discovering the factual guilt. The possibilities of error are high, 
so further scrutiny is necessary. For this reason, the importance of formal procedures 
which are not primarily focused on the efficiency of the criminal process is 
emphasized.
23
 Almost all criminal justice systems have features which belong to both 
these models though the mix of the elements varies. In Italy, the choice was to 
converge on the adversarial system in order to mark the predominance of due process 
values over crime control. 
 
2.1. Adversarialism in Italy: the preliminary investigation 
                                                 
19
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Several innovations were introduced in 1989 and the functions and status of 
prosecutors were substantially modified. But before prosecutors are put under the 
microscope it is necessary to outline some of the general characteristics of Italian 
criminal procedure. 
Criminal proceedings are divided between preliminary investigation, 
preliminary hearing and trial. The dominus of the preliminary investigation is the 
prosecutor who directs the investigation. The examining judge has been eliminated, 
but there is a preliminary investigation judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari, 
gip). Moreover, since 2000, defence attorneys can conduct their own investigation 
(art. 391 bis-decies cpp), form their own pre-trial dossier and they can also disclose to 
the prosecutor and/or to the gip the exculpatory evidence they have discovered. The 
gip does not have any power to prosecute: his functions can be broadly defined as 
protecting the rights of those under investigation.
24
 For example, it is the gip who 
decides on requests by prosecutors for pre-trial measures (including detention) (art. 
279 cpp). The law does not, however, require a warrant issued by the gip to authorize 
coercive measures like searches and seizures (with some exceptions). The police and 
prosecutors are in control of the investigation, but the gip must authorize any kind of 
interception of communications (art. 267 cpp), including telephone tapping, which, 
according to prosecutors, are now the most effective investigative measures that 
prosecutors use against serious crimes such as corruption, organized crime and 
terrorism.
25
 
There are thus similarities between the functions of the gip in Italy and the role 
of the magistrates in England and Wales. Namely, they both have a crucial role to 
authorize detention when the defendant has been charged. But there are significant 
differences as well. For example, In Italy the gip must interview –immediately or 
within 5 days- any accused person who is subject to pre-trial detention during the 
preliminary investigation phase (art. 294 cpp). In this case, the gip’s aim is to verify 
that the legal conditions necessary for detention still exist. Moreover, at the end of the 
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preliminary investigation the prosecutor decides either to send the case to trial or to 
dismiss it. The principle of compulsory prosecution requires that the decision to 
dismiss a case is not taken on a discretionary basis. The legality principle is enshrined 
in the constitution (art. 112) and, as a consequence, the Italian criminal process 
provides for procedural mechanisms that legally ensure its implementation.
26
 
Prosecutors must objectively assess if enough evidence has been gathered in order to 
establish that a crime has been committed and to support the accusation (art. 125, 
provisions for the implementation of the cpp), but a form of judicial verification is 
also necessary. So, at this stage, judicial control is exercised by the gip who may 
agree with the prosecutor’s request to dismiss the charges, order him to conduct 
further specific investigations or to charge the suspect (art. 409 cpp). Despite the shift 
to the adversarial model of process, the degree of judicial intervention in the 
investigation is still potentially great. And it is the legality principle that, at this stage 
of the proceedings, triggers judicial intervention. 
 
2.2. Adversarialism in Italy: the preliminary hearing 
 
The prosecutor’s decision to send the case to trial does not automatically lead to the 
last stage of the proceedings. Prior to the trial there is the preliminary hearing where 
the prosecutor’s decision is reviewed by the preliminary hearing judge (giudice 
dell’udienza preliminare, gup) who cannot be the same judge that acted as gip during 
the investigation (art. 34 par 2 bis cpp).  
Full evidentiary disclosure takes place before the preliminary hearing; and the 
defendant and his counsel can inspect the pre-trial dossier that has been developed by 
the prosecution (art. 419 para 2 cpp). Then, during the hearing, the prosecutor 
summarizes the results of the investigation with the aim of justifying the request to 
send the case to trial. In other words, the prosecutor will argue that the defendant must 
be tried because he or she is guilty of a crime(s). The parties can argue their case as 
well and the defendant can ask to be submitted to interrogation. Obviously, the 
counsel is entitled to present the results of the defence investigation. In practice, this 
is a trial where the evidence is presented on paper (i. e. the dossiers), so there are no 
witnesses and, consequently, there is no examination and cross-examination (but the 
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defendant can ask to be interviewed). At the end of the hearing the gup has three 
options: commit the case to trial, dismiss the case or inform the parties about the 
matters that still need to be addressed and investigated. But judicial activism is 
partially limited by the fact that the gup can only receive the additional evidence he 
deems necessary to decide whether to dismiss or send the case to trial.
27
 In essence, 
the aim of the gup is to decide if is there is enough of a case to justify the proceedings 
being sent on for trial. If the gup decides so, the counsel’s and the prosecutor’s 
dossiers form the investigation file that can be used at trial. However, not all the 
evidence collected in the pre-trial phase can be included in the trial dossier (art 431 
cpp). For example, pre-trial statements given by witnesses can only be included in the 
dossier if the parties agree. But the rule against hearsay is relaxed by other provisions 
of the cpp which, for example, allow the parties to use pre-trial statements in order to 
challenge the witness’ reliability during examination and cross-examination (art. 500 
cpp). Finally, the trial dossier also includes the record of any investigative acts that 
cannot be repeated during the trial, such as examination of DNA samples that may be 
altered by the examination process. 
In the English criminal justice system, the committal for trial historically had a 
similar function to the preliminary hearing, but today the comparison is not accurate 
anymore. The committal for trial is now a formality and magistrates Courts only 
decide on either way triable offences (the offences that can be tried by the magistrates 
or the Crown Courts). Therefore, if the offence is one triable only on indictment, there 
is no committal for trial and the case goes straight to the Crown Court. So, as for the 
preliminary investigation, the major difference between the Italian semi-adversarial 
system and the English adversarial model of criminal process is the degree of judicial 
intervention. In England judges are required not to step into the dispute between 
parties, while in Italy judges still exercise a potentially great form of control over the 
pre-trial phase.
28
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2.3. Adversarialism in Italy: the trial 
 
If the gup is convinced that there is enough evidence, the case is referred to trial. The 
trial hearing, more than any other stage of the criminal proceedings, is now envisaged 
in a form sharply contrasting with the previous inquisitorial model. In accordance 
with the common law tradition, there is a dispute between parties, evidence is 
produced to the judge in “its original form”29 and, as a consequence, the importance 
of the pre-trial dossier is limited. The adjudicator is thus fully protected from the 
contamination of the pre-trial process. To emphasize that the trial was central to the 
Italian criminal justice system, the legislator introduced the principle of ‘orality’, 
whereby “no out-of-court previous statements should be read out in court for 
evidentiary purposes”.30 This is in fact the rule against hearsay. There are however 
exceptions to this party-controlled system that allow the parties to use pre-trial 
statements. And judicial activism is clearly visible because the judge can not only 
question witnesses at the end of the examination, but can also indicate to the parties 
issues that need to be addressed during the examination. Moreover, art. 507 cpp 
allows the judge, when absolutely necessary, to examine evidence under his 
supervision. This means that the judge can call and question witnesses and/or the 
parties; but he or she does not commission further investigative acts such as 
interception of communications and search and seizures. Grande argues that initially 
this provision was an exception, but that art 507 has been broadly interpreted by the 
courts “who have essentially thrown open a half-closed door”.31 
Finally, the architecture of the adversarial-style trial has been significantly 
dismantled by three decisions of the Constitutional Court in 1992.
32
 These decisions 
extended the available opportunities to use out-of-court statements in order to increase 
the fact finders’ capacity to find the truth.33 The Court rejected the pivotal importance 
of the hearsay rule and stated that the criminal process must ensure that the truth is 
found by using, if necessary, the information included in the pre-trial dossier. This 
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view obviously conflicts with a model of criminal process controlled by the parties, 
and it shows the importance of inquisitorial institutional resistance. The Court acted at 
a very crucial historical moment, when, following the murder of judges Falcone and 
Borsellino, the state was under threat by organized crime. Later the parliament 
attempted to soften the impact of the court’s decisions by limiting the use of prior 
statements, but the court in 1998 (decision n. 361/1998) ruled that these limitations to 
the use of such statements were too severe and, once again, extended the chances to 
use this evidence. 
It is thus difficult to evaluate the extent to which adversarialism is a feature of 
the Italian criminal justice system. Defence investigation and disclosure of evidence, 
the principle of orality and the importance of examination and cross-examination tend 
towards the adversarial ideal. But judicial intervention, justified by the legality 
principle and the necessity to discover the truth, and the approach to the rule against 
hearsay, lean towards the inquest model. Langer has analyzed how plea bargaining 
(patteggiamento in Italian) was implemented in Italy, Germany, Argentina and 
France. The author argues that this procedural mechanism is a Trojan horse of the 
adversarial system because the prosecution and the defence must think of themselves 
as parties in a dispute.
34
 With regards to Italy his conclusion is that no other civil law 
country has internalized to that extent the adversarial ideal. Langer accepts that in 
Italy there is a strong degree of institutional resistance. But the extensive use of the 
plea bargaining (between 17 and 21% of misdemeanours and between 34 and 42% of 
all crimes except the most serious, between 1990 and 1998)
35
 and other indications, 
such as the possibility of defence investigation and the introduction of direct and 
cross-examination at trial, show that, to a certain extent, the model of dispute between 
parties is indeed advancing in the Italian criminal justice system.
36
 It is 
unquestionable that the introduction of the patteggiamento has had a great impact but 
there are significant differences when it is compared with the Anglo-American idea of 
plea bargaining. As Langer points out, in Italy the patteggiamento is limited in scope 
and less flexible.
37
 First, in Italy there is no guilty plea. This does not just apply to 
plea bargaining, it is a general principle of the criminal process that reflects one 
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general aim: to find the truth. Secondly, plea bargaining can only be applied if, after 
reduction, the sentence does not exceed 5 years of imprisonment and the reduction 
cannot be greater than one-third of the regular sentence. Thirdly, the bargain cannot 
involve the charges, because the legality principle requires that every crime is 
prosecuted. Finally, judicial activism is still alive. The judge, after examining the 
dossier, may reject the agreement and acquit the defendant; and the defendant can ask 
the judge to give him the one-third reduction when the prosecutor has rejected a 
proposed agreement. In this case the judge will examine the case and the reasons why 
the prosecutor did not authorize the deal with the defendant. 
Plea bargaining was part of a number of abbreviated procedures that can be 
triggered if the parties consent. These were introduced to improve the efficiency of 
the legal system and to avoid the delays of the regular trial. Amongst these measures 
there is the giudizio abbreviato (abbreviated trial) that, in practice, stops the 
proceedings at the preliminary hearing stage. This is effectively the pre-1989 
inquisitorial process whereby the judge decides on the pre-trial dossier. There is no 
examination or cross-examination, but defence counsel can argue on the basis of his 
own defence investigation. This confirms that the Italian legislator has not clearly 
chosen the adversarial ideal, but rather that there is a superimposition of two different 
systems. There has been no clear shift to the values and principles supporting the 
adversarial image of criminal process. Adversarial style procedural mechanisms have 
been added to an inquisitorial structure that has remained untouched or has been 
restored by the Constitutional court and post-1989 legislation. Italian criminal 
procedure could be dubbed semi-adversarial or semi-inquisitorial; but none of these 
definitions seems to be satisfactory if one wants to capture the professional and 
cultural values that underpin the Italian criminal justice system. As I turn to examine 
prosecutors’ institutional role and functions in the context of this ambiguous criminal 
justice system, I begin to highlight these values.    
 
3. Prosecutors and the Italian criminal justice system 
 
Italian prosecutors are part of the judiciary and they are fully independent from the 
executive. The Minister of Justice provides financial resources for the criminal justice 
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system. In England, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is founded by the Law 
Officers Department, but, unlike in Italy, the Minister of Justice has the power to 
‘superintend’ prosecutors. There are two other major differences between Italian 
prosecutors and the CPS. First, as above, in Italy prosecution is compulsory. This 
means that any consideration that is not purely legal, such as the public interest in 
prosecution or whether there is a realistic likelihood of conviction, cannot interfere 
with the prosecution of crimes. Guidelines that set priorities or criteria to define 
priorities are not legal and cannot be enforced by the government or high ranked 
prosecutors such as chief prosecutors and deputy chief prosecutors. Secondly, 
prosecutors direct the investigation and the police during the investigation. So, not 
only do Italian prosecutors charge the suspect, but they can also supervise the 
investigation and directly carry out investigative activities. This is effectively a form 
of judicial supervision that, in theory, gives to prosecutors the power to control the 
investigation.
38
 
It is apparent that the Italian and the English legislators have taken different 
paths when it comes to the definition of prosecutors’ functions. There is, however, 
one similarity. Following the abolition of the examining judge in 1989, Italian 
prosecutors, like the CPS, are now seen as a party to proceedings. But what does this 
mean in the Italian criminal justice system? Grande argues that, since the 1989 
adversarial reform, prosecutors have become “straight accusers”.39 But this 
interpretation clashes with the traditional view which still depicts prosecutors, in 
accordance with the inquisitorial tradition, as neutral quasi-judicial figures.
40
 This 
interpretation is institutionally emphasized by including prosecutors in the judiciary 
and by the legality principle. In essence, prosecutors’ independence and the legality 
principle – which are meant to preserve prosecutors’ impartiality – are seen as logical 
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implications within the criminal process of the constitutional principle of equality 
before the law (art. 3).
41
 
The reasons why the Italian constitution seeks to use the legality principle as a 
tool to protect prosecutors’ full independence are mainly historical. During the Fascist 
era prosecutors were not part of the judiciary, but rather belonged to the executive, in 
particular to the Ministry of Justice which, for example, nominated and dismissed 
them.
42
 They were an arm of a dictatorial regime, which widened their powers as 
defenders of public order.
43
 Of course that public order was fascist in nature. Thus, 
the aim of the drafters of the 1948 Italian constitution was to re-design the system so 
that impartiality and equality before the law were not limited by any executive 
pressure. According to the Italian constitutional fathers, this aim could be achieved 
through a complete independence of the judiciary. A necessary corollary of this 
independence is the legality principle that legally prevents any form of discretion in 
relation to the decision to prosecute. Therefore: prosecutors are impartial because they 
belong to the judiciary; but impartiality can only be fully implemented if no other 
constitutional power (i.e. the executive) can impose criteria to define the offences that 
must be prosecuted.   
Prosecutors’ role and status are clearly ambiguous. There is a tension between 
different interpretations that are both rooted in legal principle. The confusion is 
caused, unsurprisingly, by the mix of adversarial and inquisitorial principles. Grande 
refers to prosecutors as the fourth power, alongside the judiciary, the legislature and 
the executive. This fourth power is not constricted in any way in practice, because 
although prosecutors are members of the judiciary, they are actually straight accusers 
and, more importantly, the legality principle is not applied in practice and, as a 
consequence, it allows prosecutors full discretion to choose the cases to prosecute. In 
Grande’s view, prosecutors’ extensive powers have increased since the reform in 
1989. And today, prosecutors are enjoying all the benefits of the inquisitorial 
accusation model, like the centrality of the pre-trial dossier, but none of the 
responsibilities, because they are now required to act as party to the proceedings and 
not as impartial quasi-judicial legal actors. Another point raised by Grande is the 
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suspicion that judges’ impartiality is undermined by the lack of separation from 
prosecutors. In fact, both prosecutors and judges have to pass the same state exam and 
can switch functions. So, there is a common professional culture that potentially 
undermines the necessary degree of separation between the accuser and the 
adjudicator. These elements may deny the defendant a fair trial as it is conceived in an 
adversarial system.
44
 Grande concludes that in the current legal system the defendant 
is less protected now from abuses of power than in the pre-1989 inquisitorial 
system.
45
 
Similarly, Di Federico and Sapignoli describe prosecutors as independent 
police officers who, in practice, do not fulfil their duty to be impartial investigators.
46
 
The authors conducted a large empirical study (involving 1000 lawyers): 48.8% of the 
lawyers interviewed reported that prosecutors do not comply with article 358 cpp 
which requires them to search for exculpatory evidence; 19.5% of the lawyers said 
that prosecutors search for exculpatory evidence only when the counsel pushes them 
to do so; and only 2.1% of the lawyers said that prosecutors always search for 
exculpatory evidence.
47
 The authors describe prosecutors as straight accusers that are 
prepared to play with the interpretation of legal procedural rules to achieve a 
conviction. This means that, for example, prosecutors do not respect the legal rules 
that require them to finish the investigation in a fixed time; that pre-trial custody is 
used to put pressure on accused persons even when there are no lawful justifications 
to do so; and that witnesses are not free to report what they saw and heard, because 
prosecutors put a lot of pressure on them in order to be sure that they will support the 
prosecution’s version of events. However, as Di Federico says, the case study only 
focused on the lawyers’ perspective;48 and, in general, his analysis is aimed at 
demonstrating that there is a sharp contrast between legal rules and practice.
49
 So, the 
focus is quite narrow and there is little investigation of prosecutors’ professional and 
cultural values. Di Federico and Sapignoli wanted to prove that there was some 
distance between prosecutors’ institutional role and the practice. But they do not offer 
                                                 
44
 Grande (n 3) p. 237. 
45
 Ibid. p. 232. 
46
 G Di Federico and M Sapignoli, Processo penale e diritti della difesa (Carocci, Roma 2002) p. 16. 
See also, G Di Federico, ‘Il pubblico ministero: indipendenza, responsabilità, carriera separata’ in G Di 
Federico (ed), Manuale di Ordinamento Giudiziario (CEDAM, Padova 2004), p. 435.  
47
 Di Federico and Sapignoli (n 44) p.16. 
48
 Ibid. p. 17. 
49
 See, for example, Di Federico (n 39). 
 18 
any alternative model and they do not investigate prosecutors’ self professional image 
and its consequences for the criminal justice system.  
The arguments presented by these authors are certainly interesting, but these 
generalizations do not sufficiently consider certain features of the Italian criminal 
justice system and of prosecutors’ legal culture. It is probably true that prosecutors 
enjoy great freedom in deciding whether to prosecute a case, but this discretion does 
not seem, as Grande has put it, “unfettered”50 and fully unstructured. The analysis of 
prosecutors’ discretionary powers in the light of the legality principle goes far beyond 
the purposes of this article. However, it should be mentioned that Italian prosecutors, 
acting as ‘guardians of the law’, share a common vision of the criminal justice system 
and, more broadly, of what criminologists call the crime problem.
51
 This vision is 
reflected by the criteria prosecutors use to determine the cases that they prioritise.
52
 
So, decisions on priorities are not irrational or based on the personal political opinions 
of a single prosecutor; in general prosecutors share common professional values and 
similar socio-political views on the aims of the criminal justice system.
53
 As Keith 
Hawkins has argued: “[...] much of what is often thought to be free and flexible 
application of discretion by legal actors is in fact guided and constrained by rules to a 
considerable extent. These rules, however, tend not to be legal, but social and 
organizational in character”.54 Prosecutors’ professional values de facto constrict their 
discretion and give consistency to the decisions to prosecute.  
The strength and the extent of the defendant’s rights also need to be analyzed. 
In the Italian criminal justice system the resourceful defendant has a very effective 
weapon: the prescrizione. This legal concept indicates that there is a limitation of 
actions. Prosecutors have a time limit to put forward the accusation. This is not fixed, 
but depends on the crime which has been committed: the more serious the crime 
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committed, the longer the time-limit (and some crimes can always be prosecuted).
55
 
Limitation of actions can be very important in a country where criminal proceedings 
take on average six years.
56
 In practice, the resourceful defendant will have a good 
lawyer whose main task is not to prove their client’s innocence, but “to make the case 
overrun its allocated time”.57 Moreover, there are effectively three trials before the 
defendant is legally guilty. And there are no effective filters that prevent cases from 
being re-heard by the Court of Appeal and, on points of law, by the Corte di 
Cassazione (the equivalent of the Supreme Court in England). 
If the defendant does not have resources the scenario may change and he could 
be tried using one of the special procedures, like plea-bargaining or the giudizio 
abbreviato. As explained, these are speedy trials aimed at dealing with cases as fast as 
possible and they are mainly used to tackle street crime (e.g. burglary, street robberies 
(i.e. mugging) and drug trafficking (i.e. pushing drugs in the street). In these cases the 
defendant does not enjoy all the rights that the ordinary trial ensures. For example, if 
the defendant opts for the giudizio abbreviato the criminal process ends at the 
preliminary hearing stage and, if he or she is convicted, the sentence is reduced by 
one-third. The giudizio dirrettissimo (very fast trial) has even more radical 
consequences on the defendant’s rights. The cpp authorizes the prosecutor to use this 
speedy procedure when the defendant is caught in flagranza di reato,
58
 or when he or 
she has confessed (i.e. the evidence is conclusive). If caught red-handed the defendant 
can be tried within 48 hours of arrest (but the prosecutor can wait for up to thirty 
days); during the same hearing the judge also verifies that the arrest was lawful. The 
decision to use this special procedure is taken by the prosecutor, the defendant cannot 
refuse but can opt for the giudizio abbreviato or plea-bargaining instead of the 
giudizio direttissimo. 
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Certainly these defendants cannot rely on prescrizione and these special 
procedures can have an impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system. An 
efficient system can emphasize crime control and provide an effective tool to activate 
prosecutors’ extensive powers. In other words, prosecutors could use these procedures 
to direct their powers towards certain defendants and to avoid the prescrizione. In this 
way, they implement their discretionary choices in relation to the crimes to prosecute. 
However, even if we assume that these procedures are the first choice for 
prosecutors, there is no evidence that they have been particularly effective. The 
backlog of cases in prosecution offices and courts is still great. And, more important, 
overall numbers in prison in Italy (around a hundred per hundred thousand of the 
population) remain low compared, for example, to the UK (hundred and fifty per 
hundred thousand) and the USA (seven hundred per hundred thousand). This is very 
interesting. Like many other countries Italy is experiencing typical late-modern 
problems of crime and insecurity, though public discussion of these themes emerged 
later (mid-nineties) compared to the rest of the western world. Serious crimes like 
corruption, organized crime and white collar crimes have by no mean disappeared 
from public debate, but worries about security and crimes that involve immigrants are 
increasingly reported in the media. Illegal immigration and, often, immigration as 
such, are described as the major source of street crimes such as mugging, drug 
pushing and burglary. The fear of these crimes is confirmed by recent victimization 
surveys
59
 and it is has been one of the top issues in the political agenda of both the 
centre-right and centre-left coalitions for the last 15 years.
60
 This public and populist 
vision of criminal justice was eventually translated into legislation that, like the Bossi-
Fini Act, requires the arrest of illegal immigrants who do not comply with a 
deportation order and the prosecution of the case within 48 hours of arrest, using an 
accelerated trial (the giudizio direttissimo). All this means that in Italy there are the 
conditions for an explosion of the prison population and, to a certain extent, the 
number of immigrants (certainly not resourceful defendants) in prison has 
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substantially increased since they started arriving in the 1990s. But the overall 
numbers tell us that the Italian system is less punitive compared to other countries.
61
 
Prosecutors do not have sentencing powers, therefore the low prison 
population is not necessary a strong guide to prosecutorial power and discretion. But 
the conditions for an explosion of the prison population exist; and, assuming that, as 
Di Federico argues, prosecutors act as independent police officers, it seems logical 
that prosecutors would exploit these conditions to boost their uncontrolled powers and 
achieve the aim of obtaining more convictions. The low prison population, however, 
suggests that, on a factual level, prosecutors encounter obstacles that can moderate 
their uncontrolled discretion to interfere with citizens’ lives. The Italian criminal 
justice system is, in practice, able to correct the imbalance between prosecutors and 
the defense. Prosecutors’ status and powers must be put in the context of a very 
peculiar and complicated criminal justice system. Confusion causes lack of efficiency 
and, ultimately, this reduces prosecutors’ crime control powers. 
However, prosecutors might be powerful (i.e. the fourth power) but liberal, 
rather than powerful and punitive. In a similar vein, one can argue that the problem 
with prosecutors’ enjoying unfettered discretionary powers is still potentially 
threatening, because the criminal justice system combines extensive powers with little 
checks and balances and because incarceration rate is low but it may reflect the 
population that prosecutors want in jail. The analysis of the prison population in Italy 
and the superimposition of inquisitorial and adversarial procedural mechanisms 
suggest that the reform in 1989 has not necessarily lead to a severe limitation of the 
defendant’s rights. But this is not explanatory of prosecutors’ institutional role and 
function within the criminal justice system: the “fourth power” can be ineffective, but 
it can exist. The analysis of prosecutors’ legal culture and how this has become a form 
of resistance towards adversarialism may clarify their impact on the Italian criminal 
justice system and throw light upon the potential of their powers. 
 
4. Cultural resistance: the 1989 adversarial reform 
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Prosecutors’ cultural self-image appears to have a due process nature.62 Their 
conception of criminal procedure can be compared to the image of an adjudicative-
fact finding procedure. Cases are referred to trial if they are both legally and factually 
prosecutable. Prosecutors carry out the controls to decide if the evidence collected and 
the procedures used to discover it are legally acceptable. And, as legal filters, they 
prevent cases which have not been legally investigated from becoming prosecuted 
cases.
63
 This professional self-image is firmly rooted in the sense of themselves as 
judicial impartial figures.
64
 However, to see prosecutors as neutral and impartial 
figures is problematic because of their relationship to criminal acts and investigations. 
They supervise police investigations and determine what information gathered during 
the investigation should be passed to the judge. In so doing, they build up a case that 
will stand scrutiny at trial: they are thus functionally a party to proceedings. But 
prosecutors do not see this as meaning that they are not neutral and impartial. They 
see themselves as providing a neutral judicial filter which ensures that certain forms 
of information brought to them by investigators which is unduly prejudicial or fails 
legal tests for admissibility will not be seen by the judge. But while prosecutors see 
this legal filtering as a judicial role it inevitably means that their judicial distance from 
the prejudicial information and opinion thrown up by the police is compromised. The 
consequence is that the prosecutors’ job takes place in a context where there is an 
awareness of a wider-range of information. This context can be highly influenced by 
illegally or unfairly obtained evidence; and by information that is not legally relevant 
but is prejudicial or emotionally charged. 
There is an obvious conflict between Grande’s image of prosecutors as 
‘straight accusers’ and their professional self image. But there is also a tension 
between prosecutors’ self image and their role in practice, acting as party to the 
proceedings and trying to build up a case that would stand scrutiny at trial. This 
tension needs to be analyzed if the aim is to understand how prosecutors reacted to the 
reform in 1989 and the extent to which this reaction has influenced the criminal 
justice system. 
When prosecutors have filtered out the information that cannot be used during 
the trial they need to organize the evidence they have. In other words, prosecutors 
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have to deal with the results of the legal filtering stage in order to present these results 
during the trial. As one of the interviewed prosecutors said: “[at this stage the] 
prosecutors’ aim is to transfer as many documents as possible from their dossier to the 
judge’s dossier.” Effectively, this is an attempt to recreate the examining judge’s file 
as it has existed traditionally in inquisitorial systems. Thus, Italian prosecutors seem 
to act as if their investigation is the ‘official investigation’. This approach is not 
surprising given that prosecutors believe that the judge’s knowledge of the case is 
always limited. In the prosecutors’ view, the most effective way to solve this problem 
is not through a dispute between parties during the trial, but through the construction 
of a file that includes the evidence that has been collected during the investigation and 
that can stand scrutiny at trial. 
Prosecutors therefore distrust a model of criminal process that is based on a 
dispute between parties. Adversarial principles do not seem to have modified 
prosecutors’ professional culture. In the end, the story of the 1989 reform seems (at 
least for prosecutors) to represent more than a legal transplant. It is similar to what 
Langer has called a legal translation.
65
 The new provisions were applied and 
understood according to a legal culture which was not and is not adversarial, but 
strongly inquisitorial. This confirms the importance of inquisitorial resistance. But 
this resistance does not only stem from legislative provisions and the institutional 
quasi-judicial status of prosecutors. Prosecutors’ legal culture is proving to be strong 
and to have provided a source of cultural resistance to the internalization of the 
dispute between parties model of process. Prosecutors refuse to be considered as other 
than neutral and impartial (according to their inquisitorial viewpoint) because this 
would threaten their impartial status and, eventually, would diminish their credibility 
when they prosecute. This is why adversarial principles seem to have failed to 
transform prosecutors’ institutional role from official investigators to straight 
accusers. 
This shows that the reform in 1989 has failed to modify prosecutors’ 
inquisitorial viewpoint towards their professional values. But the analysis of 
prosecutors’ legal culture and the tension between different images of prosecutorial 
functions suggest that the mélange of inquisitorial resistance and adversarial 
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principles has not necessarily led to the limitation of defendants’ rights. The 
superimposition of different legal principles did not create a superimposition of 
prosecutors’ functions. Grande’s image of prosecutors as the “fourth power” is based 
on the assumption that they combine the inquisitorial independence, with the 
adversarial model of the dispute between parties. But prosecutors do not choose to act 
as adversarial or inquisitorial figures depending on the way the investigation and the 
trial develop. Prosecutors’ legal culture is firmly rooted in the sense of themselves as 
the impartial investigators. Therefore, they would not combine this image with new 
adversarial features that require them to act as “straight accusers”.  
In practice, during the investigation the prosecutors’ perspective is that of the 
judge because they want to build up a case that will stand scrutiny at trial. 
 
It is true that prosecutors must support the accusation, but before doing that they have to act and think 
like judges. Prosecutors must ask themselves the same questions that judges ask themselves […] A 
good prosecutor must be the judge of himself and the judge of the case. If he solves the case, because 
he believes that the accused person(s) is guilty, he will support the accusation. However, before doing 
that he must be a judge. In fact, we do it [judging] when we decide to send the case to trial or to drop 
the accusation.
66
 
 
When the prosecutor has to evaluate the evidence he must be like a judge. He must say if there is 
enough evidence to support the accusation during the trial.
67
 
 
So, in general, when I prosecute, I try to think like a judge and to decide according to the evidence that 
the judge will probably have. This is because it is useless to begin a prosecution which will end with an 
acquittal. If I decide to prosecute a case, I always try to foresee what can happen.
68
 
 
As explained, prosecutors’ commitment to act professionally and culturally 
like judges does not protect their impartiality. Hence, during the pre-trial phase, 
prosecutors’ legal culture primary effect is not to preserve neutrality, but to enable 
them to evaluate the evidence with enough judicial distance to anticipate a judge’s 
reaction. This means to assess and increase the possibilities to obtain a conviction 
and, as a consequence, it can substantially help to have a better case. Prosecutors 
present this in terms of impartiality but the very nature of the role of prosecutor as 
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filter between the information generated by the investigation and the judge means that 
the aim is to render the judge impartial not the prosecutor (in the sense of deciding 
only on legal relevant information that has been properly obtained). In this way 
prosecutors try to achieve two objectives: a) to enable judges to make decisions on 
legally relevant evidence which has been properly obtained (if the case goes to court) 
and b) to enable prosecutors to predict whether there is a ‘realistic likelihood’ of 
conviction. 
Despite the mere aspirational nature of prosecutors’ neutrality, their judicial 
distance from the investigation generates consequences for the defendant’s rights. 
While prosecutors build up the trial dossier the aim is not to prepare for a dispute 
between parties, but to search and find the truth. 
 
The prosecutor is a magistrato who is searching for the truth […] but the prosecutor is also a public 
body, as a consequence his ideas about a case should not be preconceived [i. e. to consider the accused 
person(s) guilty a priori]  Sometimes, not often, I conclude the trial asking for an acquittal. We do not 
support a thesis because we have to, but because we are searching for the truth.
69
 
 
No, he/she [the prosecutor] is not a crime fighter […] I am not a guard dog; at the same time I believe 
we are paid to do a job and we have to do it as well as we can. The good thing is that prosecutors are 
part of the judiciary and that [as a consequence] we have to search for the truth, not to obtain 
convictions.
70 
 
The truth that prosecutors search and find is different compared with the truth 
that the judge will find. As explained, prosecutors have a different awareness of the 
case because of their relationship to criminal acts and investigations. Finding the legal 
and factual truth is, therefore, another aspirational aim. Nevertheless, when 
prosecutors search for the truth, they activate a number of due process formal 
procedures that acquire importance over crime control efficiency procedural 
mechanisms. The adversarial tradition sees due process in terms of legal procedural 
constraints on the exercise of power;
71
 while Italian prosecutors’ cultural commitment 
reflects an inquisitorial viewpoint, where the emphasis is not on constraints on abuse 
of powers, but on the importance of patterns of official activity that provide protection 
to the defendant’s rights. 
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Therefore, the defendant is protected because, in prosecutors’ view, they 
control (part) of a criminal process that is designed to find the truth and not to convict 
criminals. But, as the truth that prosecutors see is different compared with the truth 
the judge will see, what can they do to activate due process mechanisms? Prosecutors’ 
legal culture ensures that the investigation and the prosecution enter a real process of 
legal normalization. In this way the defendant is partially protected from prejudicial 
information that could be collected during the pre-trial phase by the police. In 
particular, legal normalization ensures that prosecutors carry out an effective form of 
judicial supervision over the police and that the proceedings main focus is the legal 
guilt. In this context, legal guilt seems to have a twofold meaning. First, it is 
associated to compliance with procedural and substantial law. One interviewed 
prosecutor said that they closely supervise the police “because many police officers 
do not know what the criminal process needs”72 and he then referred to crimes such 
as: bankruptcy, white collar crimes in general and frauds, as crimes that require 
prosecutors’ legal knowledge to be investigated and prosecuted successfully. This is, 
to a certain extent, similar to Packer’s definition of legal guilt, whereby “factual 
determinations are made in procedurally regular fashion”.73 But focusing on the legal 
guilt also means that the judge will decide on the basis of legally relevant evidence 
(i.e. render the judge impartial)
74
 and that the defendant will not be prosecuted if this 
evidence is missing. 
Judicial supervision is a sort of pre-condition to legal guilt: if prosecutors can 
effectively supervise the investigation, they can prevent violations of procedural law 
and they can take crucial decisions on the construction of a case that will stand 
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scrutiny at trial.
75
 Whether this takes the form of a hands on or rather passive form of 
supervision, the defendant is protected by prosecutors’ scrutiny of the case. 76              
However, cases can be prosecuted and tried using speedy procedures that 
enhance the routinization of the criminal process so that it  may become an efficient 
crime control system to deal with crimes as fast as possible. As explained, this creates 
a sort of bifurcation (resourceful/not resourceful defendants) that can potentially lead 
to very different outcomes for criminal proceedings (e.g. trigger the prescrizione or 
not). But prosecutors also act as legal filters. Legal filtering applies to any case and, 
although it is mainly a passive form of review, it potentially protects defendants from 
prosecutions based on weak evidence. Moreover, prosecutors’ professional culture 
and the sense of themselves as ‘guardians of the law’ create some sort of detachment 
from the police. Prosecutors adamantly claim their right to direct the investigation. 
Although this does not ensure that a hands on form of judicial supervision will always 
take place; the cultural distance from the police enables prosecutors to influence the 
criminal proceedings from the beginning.
77
 In essence, prosecutors are influenced by 
the information collected by the police, but their sense of themselves as official 
investigators creates sufficient distance to ensure that the case will be scrutinised on 
the basis of an effective process of legal normalization. It is obvious that prosecutors 
cannot be closely involved in all the investigations; and the more the prosecutor is 
ready to commit resources (primarily his or her time) the more the scenario that has 
just been described become a reality. But even a passive review of the investigation 
(i.e. legal filtering) leaves prosecutors in charge of some crucial decisions (e.g. is 
further investigation needed? Do I need to interview the accused person(s)? Etc.).
78
 
These decisions are important to implement prosecutors’ contribution to the 
investigation and to uphold the defendant’s rights.    
The reform in 1989 of the Italian criminal justice system does not seem to 
have created a “fourth power”. As in every legal system, prosecutors have a crucial 
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and a potentially very powerful role because, together with the police, they are the 
main actors of the pre-trial phase. And it is undeniable that in Italy prosecutors’ gate-
keeping role is emphasized by their power to direct the investigation and by the 
discretion that the legality principle allows in practice. But the danger of abuses of 
power is balanced by a legal culture that still prevents prosecutors from acting upon 
weak cases. In the end, in Italy the defendant may not enjoy the same rights that are 
normally accorded to defendants in adversarial systems; and if one accepts the 
disputable new interpretation of prosecutors’ functions, the defendant is not even 
protected by prosecutors’ neutral status. The practice of prosecution is however telling 
a different story where prosecutors’ legal culture is still strongly inquisitorial, but 
nonetheless protects defendants and, to a certain extent, shapes the criminal procedure 
according to (aspirational) due process values.     
5. Legality Principle 
There are various reasons why prosecutors’ legal culture is insulated from the 
influences of adversarial principles. Some have already been outlined: independence, 
proximity to judges and a schizophrenic legal system. But it is prosecutors’ vision of 
the legality principle and its impact in the criminal justice system that provide the key 
to an understanding of prosecutors’ cultural resistance.  
The faith that Italian prosecutors have in the legality principle is not affected 
by any of the common criticisms that one can make which question the extent to 
which the principle is reflected by practice. Even the interviewed prosecutors who 
admitted that there are ways of avoiding prosecuting or fully investigating certain 
cases which are not considered important, are firmly convinced that the legality 
principle is necessary because it will always ensure more equality than any form of 
controlled discretion. Moreover, in prosecutors’ view there is no tension between the 
legality principle and priorities. In fact, the very nature of the legality principle does 
not concern when and how a case is dealt with by prosecutors; rather it implies that, 
sooner or later, the case will be dealt with. A chief prosecutor, who directed a medium 
to large prosecution office in the north of Italy, claims to have achieved the 
remarkable result that, in his prosecution office, there were no offences for which 
prosecution became impossible because of prescrizione. He explained this result as a 
fully effective application of the legality principle, with no concern for the fact that 
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some cases were treated before others and that the amount of time and resources spent 
to deal with cases can be significantly different. This confirms what Nelken and 
Zanier have found: the allocation of resources, including time, is regarded by Italian 
prosecutors as a limited and acceptable discretionary power that is compatible with 
the legality principle.
79
 Thus, only limitation of actions breaches the principle of 
compulsory prosecution. One of the interviewed prosecutors clearly said: “If I leave 
the files in the in the closet for too long there will be prescrizione. This is a de facto 
violation of the legality principle”.  
Italian prosecutors’ strong belief in the legality principle reflects the 
aspirations of the constitutional fathers. One of the interviewed prosecutors talked 
about ‘real’ equality and independence that can only be achieved through the legality 
principle; he then emphatically added that this principle is “a cause of pride for this 
country [Italy]”. Prosecutors are however aware of the difficulties that, in practice, the 
compulsory prosecution causes. In particular, they need to use resources for crimes 
that they consider very petty. One interviewed prosecutor summarised this very well: 
“I am obliged to deal, in the same way, with neighbours who had an argument and 
insulted each other and with robbers”. So, unsurprisingly, the problem is that there are 
too many cases to deal with and prosecutors do not have any power to close 
unimportant files without prosecution. Prosecutors propose different solutions to these 
problems: the organization of the prosecution office could be improved to find the 
best practices to deal with volume crimes; the government should pass legislation to 
provide more special procedures to deal with volume crimes faster and should provide 
more resources; and, more important, the parliament should pass legislation aimed at 
de-penalizing certain minor offences and introducing forms of diversion. 
None of the interviewed prosecutors said that amending the legality principle 
is an option to solve the problems that the application of this principle causes. In 
general, there is a great resistance to solutions which imply substantial discretionary 
choices. Some interviewed prosecutors suggested that the legality principle could be 
partially moderated with the introduction of (more) legally defined exceptions, but it 
has to remain the basic principle. Some others accept that the parliament and/or very 
high ranking prosecutors and judges should be able to issue general guidelines on 
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priorities. In one case one prosecutor even said that the Minister of Justice should be 
able to set guidelines; but he also specified that these guidelines should not constitute 
a “binding directive”. In prosecutors’ view, the guidelines should be persuasive, rather 
than binding. And they should merely concern how cases are prosecuted, rather than 
providing de facto exceptions to the legality principle. This is the only acceptable 
form of discretion.  
So far, prosecutors’ image of the legality principle has been analyzed. But why 
are prosecutors so adamant that this principle must remain enshrined in the Italian 
criminal justice system? Compulsory prosecution is a formal protection for 
prosecutors from suspicions or allegations of prosecuting a case for reasons other than 
the purely legal. Over the last 20 years, this has not prevented prosecutors from being 
accused of choosing political sensitive cases in order to persecute some political 
parties. However, the legality principle still provides a strong formal legal basis for 
prosecutors’ actions. Legally it is very difficult to prove that prosecutors are serving 
political rather than merely legal interests.
80
 The protection accorded by the legality 
principle is crucial to maintain prosecutors’ cultural self-image of neutral and 
impartial legal figures. In prosecutors’ view, equality and neutrality do not just protect 
victims and accused persons from abuses of power. These are values that, through the 
interpretation and the application of the legality principle, protect and enhance 
prosecutors’ professional cultural self-image. Without the legality principle, 
prosecutors’ role as ‘guardians of the law’ would be undermined, because they would 
not be seen as impartial anymore. The legality principle is thus necessary to protect 
prosecutors’ sense of their own neutrality. And, as explained, neutrality is, in 
prosecutors’ view, crucial to carry out properly their job. For example, Marcello 
Maddalena, who was chief prosecutor in Turin, has affirmed that only impartial 
prosecutors could have begun an operation like tangentopoli (bribesville) which in the 
nineties tackled corruption at the highest level - including the conviction of former 
Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. Maddalena believes this was possible (also) because 
prosecutors are seen as impartial like judges and, as a consequence, they have the 
moral and legal status to carry out such a dramatic legal action.
81
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It is within this scenario that the institutional resistance against the 1989 
reform grew up. Prosecutors have a pivotal role as the party that directs and leads the 
‘official’ impartial investigation. The fact that prosecutors cannot be impartial in 
practice is not really a problem in this context (but it raises questions about their 
professional self-image). Rather the question is: does legal culture influence the 
criminal justice system? The answer is positive. In the end, although the Italian 
criminal procedure reflects some of the traditional adversarial features, this ideal of 
criminal process has not been internalized. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
John Jackson pointed out that “an analysis [of a criminal justice system] which probes 
deeper into what the rules mean to the actors themselves is more likely to detect 
cultural resistance to the changes that are being made”.82 The case study of Italy 
confirms Jackson’s interpretation but it also poses questions about the use of legal 
culture to understand contemporary criminal justice systems. The analysis of Italian 
prosecutors’ professional culture shows that when legal actors have a cultural 
commitment to an ideal of process, this inevitably leads to distrust traditions and 
images that conflict with their legal culture and, in turn, to mediate the impact of legal 
modifications. This casts light upon the potential and the limits of their powers in 
practice. In this way, detecting resistance to legal modifications becomes a way to 
grasp the values that underpin contemporary criminal justice systems and to 
understand how procedural mechanisms work. Legal culture is central to this analysis, 
but, as I said, the aim is not that of a new taxonomy of criminal justice systems, rather 
to understand how these react to both internal and external influences. If one wants to 
explain and interpret contemporary criminal justice systems, it is necessary to pay 
attention to the differences between the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law in action’.83 And 
legal culture seems to be useful to explain if and why a distance between ‘books’ and 
‘action’ is generated by legal actors’ commitment to a certain legal tradition; and how 
and how far this commitment influences the practice. This is not by any means an 
invitation to insulate the study of modern criminal justice from the impact of socio-
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economic dynamics. In their innovative work, Cavadino and Dignan claim that 
political economy, and in particular neo-liberalism, can influence responses to crime. 
The authors compared prison population to measure punitiveness. In sum, they claim 
that neo-liberal societies follow social and economical policies that emphasise 
exclusionary cultural attitudes towards deviant individuals. On the contrary, social-
democratic and, as they call them, Continental European corporatist societies pursue 
more inclusionary socio-economic policies.
84
 Nelken argues that this thesis can be a 
plausible candidate to explain punitiveness and the increase of prison population, but 
there are other independent variables, such as criminal procedure, that need to be 
considered.
85
 In a similar vein, this paper has tried to demonstrate that legal rules and 
traditions must not be underestimated. Agencies of crime control perceive their role 
and respond to pressure in different ways. Investigating legal culture is crucial to 
explain and interpret these variable processes and, ultimately, to understand 
contemporary criminal justice systems and responses to crime.  
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